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THE CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE-RECENT
CASES AND THE ELUSIVE GOAL OF CLARITY
Harvey Gelb*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Diane, a director and public relations executive of a corporation called Discount Department Stores Inc., ("DDS"), which
owns fifteen department stores, was having lunch in a restaurant located next to the DDS headquarters building. She was
approached by Alice, a real estate agent, who had met Diane
sometime ago at a soccer game involving their children. Alice
asked Diane if she could join her for lunch, indicating that she
had a business matter she wished to discuss. Alice told Diane
that she was the selling agent for the owner of a large piece of
real estate with an asking price of $300,000. Diane was familiar with the real estate, having seen it several times while on
her way to check progress on the construction of a new DDS
department store, but until Alice told her, Diane was unaware
it was for sale. Diane told Alice she would contact her later to
discuss the real estate, but must hurry off to a DDS board of
directors meeting slated to start in ten minutes at DDS headquarters.
Suppose that Diane, thinking that the real estate would be
ideal for a shopping center, may want to buy it for herself.
Should she be concerned that she may be obligated to give DDS
an opportunity to acquire it, in preference to herself? This is
the kind of situation which brings into play issues involving the
corporate opportunity doctrine.

* Winston S. Howard Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Wyoming
College of Law. BA-, 1957, Harvard College; J.D., 1960, Harvard Law School. The
author is grateful for summer research grants for work on this article provided by
the University of Wyoming College of Law George Hopper Faculty Research Fund.
The author thanks research assistants Deby L. Forry, Tassma A. Powers, and Susan
E. Schell for their fine assistance.
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This article considers a number of significant issues involving
the corporate opportunity doctrine raised or suggested by several cases decided in the last few years. Particular attention is
given to two cases with different approaches to corporate opportunity questions-a Delaware approach and a Maine approach
utilizing principles formulated by the American Law Institute.
The assortment and potential severity of remedies for breaches of fiduciary duty, including the usurpation of corporate opportunities, are striking and frightening, or appetizing, depending on whether one is thinking as a plaintiff or defendant. For
example, in Levy v. Markal Sales Corp.,1 which is discussed
later in this article, remedies included a forced buyout of the
shares of a frozen-out plaintiff-shareholder for $499,999, forfeiture of salary and other benefits paid to wrongdoers in the
amount of $1,699,118, direct recovery of a portion of compensatory damages of $53,131 by the plaintiff-shareholder and punitive damages of $3,000,000.2 Another potential remedy in cases
involving the usurpation of a corporate opportunity is the imposition of a constructive trust with respect to improperly
acquired property in favor of the wronged corporation.3 In
today's legal climate, it would be foolish for Diane to buy the
property Alice is offering without proper consideration of her
fiduciary duties, including those involving the corporate opportunity doctrine. Corporate officials and investors should be
aware of the high stakes that may be involved in corporate
opportunity cases.
Some comments put into perspective the discussion on legal
clarity which follows. First, in the two principal approaches
discussed, those of Maine (the ALI approach) and Delaware, the
yearning of courts for clarity in the corporate opportunity area
is evident and understandable. It is preferable that corporate
investors receive desirable protection through legal rules which
are clear enough to deter fiduciary transgression or to compensate its victims. Furthermore, a sensible outcome exists if a

1. 643 N.E.2d 1206 (11. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 171 (1995).
2. See id.; regarding remedies, see also Enstar Group Inc. v. Grassgreen, 812 F.
Supp. 1562 (Ala. 1993); E.J. McKernan Co. v. Gregory, 623 N.E.2d 981 (M. App. Ct.
1993); and WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 662 (7th ed. 1995).

3. See JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 11.7 (1995).
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rule allows a corporate official to proceed justifiably in his or
her own self interest without undue delay or inappropriate
anxiety about usurping a corporate opportunity. Second, although clarity is desirable where reasonably attainable, difficult
issues may remain even where there are judicial efforts to
achieve clarity. A number of the difficult issues discussed in
this article include: the factual determination of the capacity in
which a corporate official has received an offer; the appropriate
time for the official to assess his or her obligations to the corporation and the information to be taken into account in making
the assessment; the significance of financial inability of the
corporation in determining the official's obligations;, and the
meaning and significance of "line of business" and "interest or
expectancy" considerations. Also relevant are the significance of
an official taking an opportunity without first presenting it to
the corporation, the significance of the use of corporate assets
to develop an opportunity which the official desires, and the
role of laches in determining liability in a corporate opportunity
case. Third, the difficulty in achieving clarity should not be
surprising in the corporate opportunity area, where the loyalty
of officials is sometimes questioned in the presence of various
factual and equitable considerations.
There are limits to the scope of this article. First, this article
focuses on corporate opportunity claims and is not aimed at
dealing with legal theories which, in some cases, may overlap
with the corporate opportunity cause of action. For example,
cases involving the corporate opportunity doctrine may also
involve claims for the misappropriation of corporate property, or
for improperly competing with one's corporation. Consider, for
example, the possible overlap of theories set forth by the American Law Institute ("ALI") in Principles of Corporate Governance
section 5.04 (use by a director or senior executive of corporate
property, material non-public corporate information, or corporate position)4 and ALI section 5.06 (competition with the corporation)5 with ALI section 5.05 (taking of corporate opportunities by directors or senior executives). Second, this article fo-

4. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(1992) (hereinafter ALl sections).
5. Id. § 5.06.

6. Id. § 5.05.

§ 5.04
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cuses on the duties of corporate directors and officers and not
on those of subordinate employees under agency law. In referring to its own Part V, which involves the duty of fair dealing
including rules pertaining to the taking of corporate opportunities, the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance states:
By and to whom is the duty of fair dealing owed? It has
been traditionally recognized by the courts that directors
owe a duty of fair dealing to their corporation. The courts
have usually treated officers in the same category as directors when imposing and enforcing the duty of fair dealing.
With respect to officers, Part V deals only with senior executives [§ 1.33], but officers other than senior executives are
generally subject to the same duties of fair dealing as those
imposed on senior executives, as a matter of either corporation law or agency law. The obligations of subordinate employees are measured by the duty of fair dealing applicable
to agents. See Restatement, Second, Agency §§ 387-398.'
Third, this article does not attempt, in treatise-like fashion, to
cover or refer to numerous cases, but focuses on several recent
illustrative cases and a number of issues arising in or suggested by them.
II. MAINE REVIEWS SEVERAL APPROACHES AND FOLLOWS
THE ALI TEST
Court decisions offer various tests for determining the application of the corporate opportunity doctrine to given situations.8 In a significant 1995 case, Northeast Harbor Golf Club,
Inc. v. Harris,9 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine ("Maine
Supreme Court") reviewed the line of business, fairness, line of
business plus fairness, and ALI tests, and decided to adopt the
ALI approach.
In this case, Harris, the president of Northeast Harbor Golf
Club, a Maine corporation, was alleged to have committed a
breach of fiduciary duty as president of the Club by buying and
developing property abutting the Club's golf course. There were
7. Id.

8. See id. § 5.05 n.2.
9. 661 A.2d 1146 (Me. 1995).
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actually three purchases of real estate by Harris. As to the first
purchase, a broker testified that he contacted Harris because
she was president and he believed that the Club would be interested in buying the property to prevent development. Harris,
however, purchased the property, later informing the board of
directors of her purchase, her intention to hold the property in
her own name, and that the Club would be protected.
Harris testified that she told a number of board members
about her attempt to purchase a second parcel, and formally
disclosed to the board at a meeting that she had purchased the
property. 0 According to the minutes of that board meeting,
she told the board that she had no present development plans
for that parcel. The board took no formal action in response to
the Harris purchase. Harris acquired a third property in order
to gain access to the second parcel. Harris subsequently divided
the real estate into lots owned by herself and her children, and
eventually she and her children began the process of obtaining
approval for subdivision purposes. Although a majority of the
board refused to take action after the board learned of the
subdivision, a group of directors formed an organization to
oppose the subdivision as violating the local zoning ordinance.
After plans to develop the subdivision became apparent, the
board became more divided over the propriety of development
near the golf course.
One member of the board testified that he had relied on
Harris's representations that she would not develop the properties." According to the testimony of that member, matters
came to a head "when a number of directors concluded that the
development plans irreconcilably conflicted with the Club's
interests."' Harris was asked to resign and, after a substantial change in board membership, the board authorized a suit
against her for breach of her fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation.'
Allegations were made that during her term Harris breached
her fiduciary duty by purchasing the lots without providing

10.
11.
12.
13.

See id. at 1146.
See id. at 1148.
Id.
See id. at 1146-1148.

376

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:371

notice and an opportunity for the Club to buy the property and
by subdividing the lots for future development.' 4 The Club
sought an injunction to prevent development and sought to
impose a constructive trust on the property for the benefit of
the Club. The trial court found that there was no usurpation of
a corporate opportunity because acquisition of the real estate
was not in the Club's line of business, and that the corporation
lacked the financial ability to buy the real estate.'5 The court
placed great emphasis on Harris's good faith, noting her long,
dedicated history of service to the Club, her personal oversight
of its growth and her frequent financial contributions. 6 The
court found the development activities generally compatible
with the business of the corporation."
For convenience, discussion of Northeast Harbor is divided
into three segments: a) Review of Tests by the Maine Supreme
Court; b) Adoption of the ALI Approach; and c) Laches and
Other Issues on Remand.
A. Review of Tests by the Maine Supreme Court
1. The Line of Business Test
The Maine Supreme Court, pointing to the confusion about
the specific extent of the duty of loyalty when it is contended
that a fiduciary has taken for herself a corporate opportunity,
reviewed different versions of the corporate opportunity doctrine. The following passage from its opinion deals with the
court's review of the line of business test:
Various courts have embraced different versions of the corporate opportunity doctrine. The test applied by the trial
court... is generally known as the "line of business" test.
The seminal case applying the line of business test is Guth
v. Loft, Inc. In Guth, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted
an intensely factual test stated in general terms as follows:

14.
15.
16.
17.

See
See
See
See

id. at 1148.
id.
id.
id.
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"[I]f there is presented to a corporate officer or director a
business opportunity which the corporation is financially
able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of the
corporation's business and is of practical advantage to it, is
one in which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity, the
self-interest of the officer or director will be brought into
conflict with that of his corporation, the law will not permit
him to seize the opportunity for himself."
The "real issueP under this test is whether the opportunity "was so closely associated with the existing business
activities... as to bring the transaction within that class
of cases where the acquisition of the property would throw
the corporate officer purchasing it into competition with his
company." The Delaware court described that inquiry as "a
factual question to be decided by reasonable inferences from
objective facts.'
The Maine Supreme Court noted significant weaknesses in the
line of business test. It stated that the question of whether an
activity is within the line of business of a corporation is "conceptually difficult to answer."' The court indicated that although the Club is in the business of running a golf course and
not developing real estate, the record would support a finding
that the Club had determined that the development of surrounding real estate was detrimental to its best interests. The
record also showed occasional consideration by the Club of "expanding its operations to include the development of surrounding real estate."20
The court also indicated that the Guth test includes an element of financial ability, and that the court below relied on the
Club's supposed financial incapacity as a basis for excusing the
president's conduct. The court pointed to the following problems
in connection with financial incapacity:
Often, the injection of financial ability into the equation
will unduly favor the inside director or executive who has

18. Id. at 1149 (citations omitted) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (DeL
1939)).
19. Id.
20. Id
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command of the facts relating to the finances of the corporation. Reliance on financial ability will also act as a
disincentive to corporate executives to solve corporate financing and other problems.2
2. The Fairness Test
The Maine Supreme Court also pointed to the test adopted in
Massachusetts known as the fairness test. Quoting a Massachusetts case, the Maine Supreme Court said that the
true basis of governing doctrine rests on the unfairness in
the particular circumstances of a director, whose relation to
the corporation is fiduciary, taking advantage of an opportunity [for her personal profit] when the interest of the corporation justly call[s] for protection. This calls for application
of ethical standards of what is fair and equitable ... in
particular sets of facts.'
Referring to the need under the Massachusetts test for a broadranging, intensely factual inquiry, the Maine Supreme Court
stated that the "test suffers even more than the Guth test from
a lack of principled content," and "[ilt provides little or no practical guidance to the corporate officer or director seeking to
measure her obligations."'
3. The Minnesota Test
The court also referred to the Minnesota test, which combines
the line of business test with the fairness test.' The Minnesota test involves a "two-step analysis, first determining whether
a particular opportunity was within the corporation's line of
business, then scrutinizing 'the equitable considerations existing
prior to, at the time of, and following the officer's acquisition."" The court pointed to the weakness of the Minnesota

21.
22.
(Mass.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id. at 1149-50 (quoting Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 80 N.E.2d 522, 529
1948)).
Id at 1150.
See id. (citing Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.21 71, 81 (Minn. 1974)).
Id (quoting Miller, 222 N.W.2d at 81).
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test of merely piling the "uncertainty and vagueness of the
fairness
test on top of the weaknesses of the line of business
2
test."
B. Adoption of the ALI Approach
The Maine Supreme Court stated that despite their weaknesses, the above-mentioned approaches to the corporate opportunity doctrine rest on a single fundamental policy that "recognizes that a corporate fiduciary should not serve both corporate and personal interests at the same time."27 Nevertheless,
the court pointed to the need to moderate the potentially harsh
consequences of strict adherence to that policy. The court stated: "It is important to preserve some ability for corporate fiduciaries to pursue personal business interests that present no
real threat to their duty of loyalty."'
The Maine Supreme Court decided to follow still another
approach for the resolution of the corporate opportunity problem-the approach set forth in ALI section 5.05.2'
Section 5.05 is aimed at directors and senior executives and
does not purport to cover the conduct of others. 0 Section 5.05
forbids a director or senior executive from taking advantage of
a corporate opportunity without first offering it to the corporation and making certain disclosures to the corporation."' In
addition, the opportunity must be rejected by the corporation.

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id at 1150-51 (citing ALI, supra note 4, § 5.05).
30. See ALI, supra note 4, § 5.05. A "senior executive" means an officer as described in the definition of officer in ALI § 1.27(a) or (b). Id § 1.33. An "officer"
"means (a) the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, and accounting officers of a
corporation; (b) to the extent not encompassed by the foregoing, the chairman of the
board of directors (unless the chairman neither performs a policy making function
other than as a director nor receives a material amount of compensation in excess of
director's fees), president, treasurer, and secretary, and a vice-president or vice-chairman who is in charge of a principal business unit, division, or function (such as
sales, administration, or finance) or performs a major policy making function for the
corporation; and c) any other individual designated by the corporation as an officer."
Id. § 1.27; see supra note 7 and accompanying text for reference to subordinate employees.
31. See ALI, supra note 4, § 1.14(a)-(b) for the definition of disclosure.
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The rejection will be effective to protect the director or senior
executive if it satisfies any of the following three tests under
section 5.05(a)(3):
Either:
(A) The rejection of the opportunity is fair to the corporation;
(B) The opportunity is rejected in advance, following such
disclosure, by disinterested directors [§ 1.15], or, in the case
of a senior executive who is not a director, by a disinterested superior, in a manner that satisfies the standards of the
business judgment rule [§ 4.01(c)]; or

(C) The rejection is authorized in advance or ratified,
following such disclosure, by disinterested shareholders [§
1.161, and the rejection is not equivalent to a waste of corporate assets [§ 1.42].32
The problem of defining a corporate opportunity is dealt with
in section 5.05(b). Under this section, a corporate opportunity
means:
(1) Any opportunity to engage in a business activity of
which a director or senior executive becomes aware, either:
(A) In connection with the performance of functions as
a director or senior executive, or under circumstances that
should reasonably lead the director or senior executive to
believe that the person offering the opportunity expects it to
be offered to the corporation; or

(B) Through the use of corporate information or property, if the resulting opportunity is one that the director or
senior executive should reasonably be expected to believe
would be of interest to the corporation. .

. .

In addition, for a senior executive, a corporate opportunity
means "any opportunity to engage in a business activity of
which a senior executive becomes aware and knows is closely
related to a business in which the corporation is engaged or
expects to engage."'
Section 5.05 also deals with the burden of proof and states
that the party who challenges the taking of a corporate oppor32. ALI, supra note 4, § 5.05(a)(3).

33. Id. § 5.05(b).
34. Id. § 5.05(b)(2).
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tunity has the burden of proof, except that if such party establishes that the requirements of subsection (a) (3) (B) or (C) are
not met, then the burden is on the director or senior executive
to prove that the rejection and the taking of the opportunity
were fair to the corporation.'
Furthermore, section 5.05 contains a rule for curing a defective disclosure of the facts concerning the corporate opportunity
where the disclosure was made in good faith. It also contains a
special rule concerning the delayed offer of corporate opportunities, which reads as follows:
Relief based solely on failure to first offer an opportunity to
the corporation under Subsection (a)(1) is not available if:
(1) such failure resulted from a good faith belief that the
business activity did not constitute a corporate opportunity,
and (2) not later than a reasonable time after suit is filed
challenging the taking of the corporate opportunity, the
corporate opportunity is to the extent possible offered to the
corporation and rejected in a manner that satisfies the
standards of Subsection (a).'
The Maine Supreme Court pointed to "the central feature of
the ALI test [a]s the strict requirement of full disclosure prior
to taking advantage of any corporate opportunity,""7 accepted
the notion that the ALI test is an opportunity to bring some
clarity to a murky area of the law, and decided to follow the
ALI test. It saw the disclosure-oriented approach as providing a
clear procedure for the corporate officer to insulate herself
through proper disclosure from the possibility of a legal
challenge. 8
The court felt that the disclosure requirement recognizes the
paramount importance of the duty of loyalty while protecting
the ability of the fiduciary, pursuant to proper procedure, to
pursue her own business ventures free from the possibility of a
lawsuit.39 The court specifically referred to testimony by the
broker respecting the property first purchased by Harris which,
35. See I& § 5.05(c).
36. Id. § 5.05(e).
37. Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc., 661 A.2d 1146, 1151 (citation omitted).

38. See id. at 1152.
39. See iU

382

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:371

if believed by the fact finder, would support a finding that the
property was offered to Harris specifically in her capacity as
president; if the factfinder reached that conclusion, then the
opportunity to acquire the property would be a corporate opportunity. 0
Suppose Harris reasonably believed the property was not
offered to her in connection with her corporate functions. The
court's position evidently turns on the intent of the broker, not
the reasonable belief of the corporate official. The court's position might be supported by the language of section 5.05(b)(1)(A),
where the reasonable belief language could be held to apply not
to the "performance of functions" portion, but only to the "or
under circumstances" portion. Although such an interpretation
may, at times, bring about unfair or unreasonable results, it is
possible.
C. Laches and Other Issues on Remand
Having formulated the applicable legal standard, the court
remanded the case for further proceedings in light of the new
legal standard. It should also be noted that the court made it
clear that Harris had raised the defenses of laches and the
statute of limitations, which had not been ruled on below. The
Maine Supreme Court refused to indicate how it would rule on
the application of either doctrine in this case. 4' As to the issue
of remedy, which had not been addressed by the trial court in
the first trial, the Maine Supreme Court pointed out that "the
court has broad discretion to fashion an equitable remedy based
on the facts and circumstances of the case"42 and declined to
invade the province of the lower court "by commenting prematurely on what remedy, if any, may be appropriate."'

40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 1151.
See id. at 1152 n.3.
Id.
Id
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III. BROZ CASE-DELAWARE SUPREME COURT
In a significant recent case involving the corporate opportunity doctrine, Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc.," the
Delaware Supreme Court took a different approach than did the
Maine Court in Northeast Harbor.
Robert F. Broz, president and sole stockholder of RFB Cellular, Inc. ("EFBC"), a corporation in the business of providing
cellular telephone service, was also a member of the board of
directors of Cellular Information Systems, Inc. ("CIS"), a publicly-held Delaware corporation and competitor of RFBC.' The
Delaware Supreme Court pointed out that Broz's efforts were
devoted primarily to the business operations of RFBC, that he
was an outside director of CIS at the time of the events at
issue, and that CIS was fully aware of his relationship with
RFBC and his obligations arising from the relationship. Broz
purchased for RFBC, from Mackinac Cellular Corp.
("Mackinac"), a cellular telephone service license issued by the
Federal Communications Commission, the Michigan-2 Rural
Service Area Cellular License ("Michigan-2"). CIS brought an
action against Broz and RFBC contending that the purchase
was a usurpation of a corporate opportunity belonging to CIS.
A brokerage firm representing Mackinac contacted Broz in
May 1994, regarding the possible acquisition of Michigan-2 by
RFBC. Michigan-2 was not offered to CIS, which had been
having financial difficulties and had divested itself of a number
of license systems. Broz spoke of his interest in acquiring Michigan-2 to the CIS chief executive officer and was told by the
latter that CIS was not interested in Michigan-2. Broz also
spoke to two other CIS directors who indicated a lack of interest on the part of CIS in Michigan-2. At trial, each CIS director
testified about his belief that, at the time the opportunity was
presented to Broz, CIS would not have been interested in it.
Before Broz acquired Michigan-2, another corporation,
PriCellular, Inc. ("FriCellular"), became involved in steps to
acquire CIS and commenced a tender offer on August 2, 1994,
for all outstanding shares of CIS. Because of financing difficul44. 673 A.2d 148 (Del 1996).
45. See id. at 150.
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ties, PriCellular delayed the closing date of the tender offer
from September 16, 1994, until October 14, 1994, and again
until November 9, 1994. On August 6, September 6, and September 21, 1994, Broz made written offers to Mackinac to purchase Michigan-2. During this same time period, PriCellular
also negotiated with Mackinac to arrange an option to purchase
that license. CIS was aware that both PriCellular and Broz
were bidding for Michigan-2, but did not interpose itself in the
bidding war.
In late September 1994, PriCellular and Mackinac agreed on
an option to buy Michigan-2 at an exercise price of $6.7 million.
The option was nontransferable to any party other than a subsidiary of PriCellular. According to the Delaware Supreme
Court, it could not, therefore, have been transferable to CIS.
The agreement also provided that Mackinac could sell Michigan-2 to any party willing to top the exercise price by at least
$500,000. On November 14, 1994, Broz agreed to pay $7.2 million for the Michigan-2 license. On November 23, 1994,
PriCellular completed its financing and closed its tender offer
for CIS. Before that time, PriCellular had no equity interest in
CIS. Thereafter, members of the CIS board of directors, including Broz, were discharged and replaced with PriCellular nominees. In March 1995, CIS commenced the action involved in the
Broz case in the Delaware Court of Chancery."
The court of chancery took the position that CIS could require its director, Broz, to abstain from the Michigan-2 transaction, despite the fact that it came to the director in an independent way. The court pointed out that the transaction fell quite
close to the core transactions for which the corporation was
formed, and that, by no later than the time the tender offer
was extended, the circumstances of the company changed so
that it was quite plausibly in the interest of the corporation
and financially feasible for it to pursue the Michigan-2 transaction.47 The court of chancery found that, in the circumstances
as existed "at the latest after October 14, 1994 (date of
PriCellular's option contract on Michigan 2 RSA),"' it was the

46. See id. at 151-53.
47. See id. at 153.
48. Id
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obligation of Broz as a CIS director, to take the transaction to
the CIS board for its formal action. The court of chancery held
that:
[Elven though knowledge of the availability of the Michigan
2 RSA license and its associated assets came to Mr. Broz
wholly independently of his role on the CIS board, that opportunity was within the core business interests of CIS at
the relevant times; that at such time CIS would have had
access to the financing necessary to compete for the assets
that were for sale; and that the CIS board of directors were
not asked to and thus did not consider whether such action
would have been in the best interests of the corporation. In
these circumstances I conclude that Mr. Broz as a director
of CIS violated his duty of loyalty to CIS by seizing this
opportunity without formally informing the CIS board fully
about the opportunity and facts surrounding it and by proceeding to acquire rights for his benefit without the consent
of the corporation.49

The Delaware Supreme court reversed the court of chancery.
For the sake of convenience, discussion of the analysis of the
Delaware Supreme Court may be divided into several segments:
a) the doctrines of Guth5 ° and its progeny; b) flexible application of the tests from Guth and its progeny; c) importance of
how the director learned of the opportunity; d) factors analysis;
and e) need for formal presentation.
A. The Doctrines of Guth and Its Progeny
In considering the application of the corporate opportunity
doctrine, the Delaware Supreme Court referred to the holding
from Guth as follows:

[I]f there is presented to a corporate officer or director a
business opportunity which the corporation is financially
able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of the
corporation's business and is of practical advantage to it, is
one in which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity, the

49. Id. at 154 (quoting Cellular Info. Sys. Inc. v. Broz, 663 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Del.
Ch. 1995 (citing Yiannatsis v. Stephanis, 653 A.2d 275 (Del. 1995))).
50. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939).
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self-interest of the officer or director will be brought into
conflict with that of the corporation, the law will not permit
him to seize the opportunity for himself.5

The court then explained the corporate opportunity doctrine
from Guth and its progeny as holding that the corporate officer
or director may not take the business opportunity if:
(1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity; (2) the opportunity is within the corporation's line of
business; (3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy
in the opportunity; and (4) by taking the opportunity for his
own, the corporate fiduciary will thereby be placed in a
position inimicable to his duties to the corporation.52
The court also referred to a corollary derived by the Guth
court stating:
that a director or officer may take the corporate opportunity
if. (1) the opportunity is presented to the director or officer
in his individual and not his corporate capacity; (2) the
opportunity is not essential to the corporation; (3) the corporation holds no interest or expectancy in the opportunity;
and (4) the director or officer has not wrongfully employed
the resources of the corporation in pursuing or exploiting
the opportunity.'
B. Flexible Application of the Tests from Guth and Its Progeny
Notwithstanding the manner of listing factors from the tests

from Guth and its progeny, the court made it clear that the
tests "provide guidelines to be considered by a reviewing court
in balancing the equities of an individual case."' The court
pointed out that "In]o one factor is dispositive and all factors
must be taken into account insofar as they are applicable."5
Referring to the multitude of factual settings involved in corporate opportunity cases and the difficulty of crafting hard and

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Broz, 673 A.2d at 154 (quoting Guth, 5 A.2d at 510).
Id. at 155.
Id. (citing Guth 5 A.2d at 509).
Broz, 673 A.2d at 155.
Id.
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fast rules to deal with such an array of complex situations, the
court pointed out that "the determination of '[w]hether or not a
director has appropriated for himself something that in fairness
should belong to the corporation is 'a factual question to be decided by reasonable inference from objective facts.""5 The
court found that the facts did not support the conclusion that
Broz misappropriated a corporate opportunity.
C. Importance of How the DirectorLearned of the Opportunity
In explaining its position, the court placed significance on the
fact that Broz learned of the Michigan-2 opportunity in his
individual, and not his corporate, capacity. The license was not
offered to CIS. Thus, "many of the fundamental concerns undergirding the law of corporate opportunity are not present (e.g.,
misappropriation of the corporation's proprietary information)."57 This, according to the court, reduced the burden on
Broz to show adherence to his fiduciary duties at CIS. Still, the
court did not find this point to be dispositive, indicating that
determining if there has been a usurpation of a corporate opportunity by the fiduciary "necessitates a careful examination of
the circumstances, giving due credence
to the factors enunciated
58
in Guth and subsequent cases."
D. FactorsAnalysis
The court then turned to an analysis of factors relied on by
the trial court.
1. Financial Ability and Timing
The court, in dealing with the issue of whether CIS was
financially capable of exploiting the Michigan-2 opportunity,
determined that the finding of the lower court of financial capability was not supported by the evidence. The lower court was
of the view that PriCellular could eliminate financial obstacles
to the acquisition of Michigan-2 by CIS. The Delaware Supreme
56.
5 A.2d
57.
58.

ML(quoting Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919, 923 (DeL 1956) (quoting Guth,
at 513)).
Broz, 673 A.2d at 155.
ld
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Court pointed out that "laitthe time that Broz was required to
decide whether to accept the Michigan-2 opportunity,
PriCellular had not yet acquired CIS, and any plans to do so
were wholly speculative.""9 Broz was not obligated to consider
the two contingencies of a PriCellular acquisition of CIS and
action thereafter by PriCellular to remove financial obstacles to
the acquisition of Michigan-2. 0 Significantly, the court took
the position that "Broz was required to consider the facts only
as they existed at the time he determined to accept the
Mackinac offer and embark on his efforts to bring the transaction to fruition.""'
2. Line of Business
Second, the court referred to the line of business factor stating that "it may properly be said that the opportunity is within
the corporation's line of business."6 2
3. Interest or Expectancy and Timing
Third, the court pointed to the factor laid down in the Guth
case indicating that "for an opportunity to be deemed to belong
to the fiduciary's corporation, the corporation must have an
interest or expectancy in that opportunity."6 3 Quoting another
case, the court explained "'Ifor the corporation to have an
actual or expectant interest in any specific property, there must
be some tie between that property and the nature of the
corporate business."" Stressing that the crucial time was
when the opportunity was presented, the court pointed out that,
at that time, CIS was actively divesting its license holdings.
The court referred to the testimony of the entire CIS board that
the Michigan-2 license would not have been of interest to CIS,
even absent its financial difficulties and its then-current desire
59. Id at 156.
60. See id
61. I&
62. Id at 156 n.7 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 513 (Del 1956). See
infra notes 140 and 141 and accompanying text for further discussion of the line of
business factor in the Broz case.
63. Id. at 156.
64. Id (quoting Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919, 924 (Del. 1956)).
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to liquidate its cellular license holdings. The court concluded
that CIS had no interest or expectancy in the Michigan-2
opportunity.
4. Conflicting Interest and Timing
The court also examined the question of whether the taking
of the opportunity by Broz resulted in a conflict with his duties
to the corporation and his self-interest. The court said:
Broz took care not to usurp any opportunity which CIS was
willing and able to pursue. Broz sought only to compete
with an outside entity, PriCellular, for acquisition of an
opportunity which both sought to possess. Broz was not
obligated to refrain from competition with PriCellular.
Therefore, the totality of the circumstances indicates that
Broz65did not usurp an opportunity that properly belonged to
CIS.

5. Need for Formal Presentation
The court next considered the position of the court of chancery that, in the circumstances existing "'at the latest after
October 14, 1994, (the date of PriCellular's option contract on
Michigan 2 RSA)," 65 Broz was obligated "as a director of CIS
to take the transaction to the CIS board for its formal action.... ."

The Delaware Supreme Court found that the trial

court erroneously grafted onto the law of corporate opportunity
a new "requirement of formal presentation under circumstances
where the corporation does not have an interest, expectancy or
financial ability."' Explaining that the director or officer must
analyze the situation ex ante to determine if an opportunity
rightfully belongs to a corporation, the supreme court stated
that "[i]f the director or officer believes, based on one of the
factors articulated above, that the corporation is not entitled to

65.
66.
1995)).
67.
68.

Broz, 673 A.2d at 157.
Id. (quoting Cellular Info. Sys., Inc. v. Broz, 663 A.2d 1180, 1185 (DeL Ch.
Broz, 673 A.2d at 157.
Id
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the opportunity, then he may take it for himself."69 The court
explained that "presenting the opportunity to the board creates
a kind of 'safe harbor' for the director, which removes the specter of a post hoc judicial determination that the director or
officer has improperly usurped a corporate opportunity."0
The Delaware Supreme Court refused to accept the finding of
the trial court that Broz was required to consider PriCellular's
prospective, post-acquisition plans for CIS in determining
whether to forgo the opportunity or seize it for himself. According to the supreme court, the lower court felt that if Broz had
done this, he would have determined that CIS "was entitled to
the opportunity because of its alignment of interests with
PriCellular. The supreme court disagreed, stating that Broz was
under no duty to consider PriCellular's interest when he chose
to buy Michigan-2. The court emphasized timing, stating that
"a director's right to 'appropriate [an] ... opportunity depends
on the circumstances existing at the time it presented itself to
him without regard to subsequent events."7 1 The court pointed
out that when Broz purchased Michigan-2, PriCellular had not
yet acquired CIS and any plans to do so would have been speculative and that Broz was not required to consider the contingent and uncertain plans of PriCellular in reaching his determination on how to proceed.
IV. ILLINOIS- MARKAL CASE-LINE OF BUSINESS AND USE OF
CORPORATE RESOURCES

Both the line of business test and the improper use of corporate resources have been referred to earlier. As indicated above,
the Broz case refers to the wrongful use of corporate resources
by a director in pursuing or exploiting the opportunity. The
court considered it significant that Broz learned of the opportunity in his individual capacity and did not misappropriate corporate proprietary information. In addition, ALI section 5.05
attaches significance to the issue of whether the corporate di-

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 158 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 513 (Del. Ch. 1939)).
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rector or senior executive becomes aware of the opportunity
through the use of corporate information or property."
A recent Illinois case is helpful in considering both the line of
business test and the use of corporate resources issue."
Markal Sales Corporation ("Markal") served as a sales representative for electronic manufacturers including manufacturers of
CB radios, consumer electronic components, and audio equipment.7 4 Levy, a forty-percent shareholder of Markal, sued two
of its directors, Gust, a forty-percent shareholder, and Bakal, a
twenty-percent shareholder. 5 The latter two had an agreement
providing for employment with Markal7 The employment contract called for devotion of substantially all time, attention and
energies to Markal business for one, and for full-time employment with Markal for the other.77 Gust was contacted by a
sales manager of Apple Computers ("Apple") to discuss representation of Apple. Gust and Bakal negotiated with the Apple
sales manager and set up G/B Marketing ("G/B") to serve as
Apple's representative. 8
The court cited language indicating that individuals who
control corporations owe them and their shareholders a fiduciary duty;"9 that the three shareholders had mutual obligations
similar to partners and a fiduciary duty to deal openly and
honestly with each other;" "and to 'exercise the utmost good
faith and honesty in all dealings and transactions' relating to
each other and to Markal." 8 '

72. See ALI, supra note 4, § 5.05.
73. Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 643 N.E.2d 1206 (IML App. Ct. 1994), cert. denied,

116 S.
74.
75.
76.

Ct. 171 (1995).
See id. at 1210.
See id.
See id.

77. See id.
78. See id. at 1211.
79. See id. at 1214 (citing Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 560 (IlL App. Ct.
1982)).
80. See id., 643 N.E.2d at 1214 (citing Illinois Rockford Corp v. Kulp, 242 N.E.2d
228 (Ill. 1968)).
81. Id., 643 N.E.2d at 1214 (quoting Couri v. Couri, 447 N.E.2d 334 (IlL 1983)).
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The court set forth the following principles:
Gust and Bakal, as fiduciaries, could not place themselves
"in a position where their own individual interests might
interfere with the performance of their duties to their corporation" and could not use their positions for their own
personal gain. Also, they were governed by the "corporate
opportunity doctrine, [which] prohibits a corporation's fiduciary from taking advantage of business opportunities which
are considered as 'belonging' to the corporation." Gust and
Bakal, as the directors and fiduciaries of Markal, "have the
burden of establishing the fairness and propriety of the[ir]
transactions." 2
The court held that Gust and Bakal breached their fiduciary
duties to the corporation and the complaining shareholder because of their failure to offer the Apple opportunity to Markal,
and because of the use of Markal assets for the benefit of G/B
and another corporation handling Apple sales which Gust and
Bakal formed.'
The Illinois court's use of the "line of business" test evidently
did not allow for the financial inability excuse from Guth and
Broz. The court cited the general rule that a corporation's fiduciary, who wants to take advantage of a business opportunity
which is in the corporation's line of business, must first disclose
and tender the opportunity to the corporation, even if the fiduciary believed that the corporation was legally or financially
incapable of taking advantage of the opportunity.'
In resolving the case before it, the court indicated it had to
determine whether the Apple opportunity was reasonably incident to Markal's present or future business.' Among the testimony that the court cited to support the trial judge's findings
that the Apple opportunity was reasonably incident to a prospective business of Markal was the evidence that Markal was
interested in entering the computer field and making the sale
of computers part of its prospective business; that the original

82. Id., 643 N.E.2d at 1214 (citations omitted).
83. See id. at 1215-16.
84. See iL at 1215 (citing Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 549 (L App. Ct.
1982)).

85. See id- at 1216.
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negotiations with Apple were conducted by Gust and Bakal
when they where solely employees of Markal; and that Markal
was being considered as an Apple representative.86 Having "determined that the Apple opportunity was reasonably incident to
a prospective business of Markal,"17 the court took the position
that Gust and Bakal could not take advantage of it without
first offering it to Markal and without a rejection by Markal in
the face of possible detriment, such as losing present clients by
becoming the Apple representative.88 The court indicated that
Markal should have the chance to decide the question for itself
and to explore other ways of dealing with the problem of pursuing the Apple opportunity. 89
In the alternative, the court indicated that the breach of duty
by Gust and Bakal should also be affirmed because of their use
of Markal assets to develop and support G/B, estopping them
from arguing the unavailability of the Apple opportunity to
Markal." It is significant to note the kinds of assets which the
court looked to in deciding that corporate resources were improperly used. For one thing, the court pointed to the use of
time of Gust and Bakal to benefit G/B. s ' This use of time occurred even though they had an agreement calling for either

the devotion of substantially all time or full time to Markal. s2
Also, there had been an underpayment of rent from G/B to
Markal according to certain evidence; in addition, evidence
supported the conclusion that Markal paid several employees'
salaries and expenses while they worked for G/B. 93 The court
concluded that the defendants owed fiduciary duties to Markal,
but used Markal assets to benefit themselves and develop the

86. See id.
87. 1&
88. See Uc

89.
90.
91.
92.

See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 1217.
id.
id.

93. See id. at 1218.
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Apple opportunity and that these acts estopped them from
arguing that Markal could not have represented Apple."
V. GUTH COROLLARY AND USE OF CORPORATE ASSETS
ESTOPPEL (RAPISTAN)
5 a Michigan Court of ApIn Rapistan Corp. v. Michaels,"
peals applying Delaware law had to consider whether the acquisition of a related business, Alvey Inc., was a corporate opportunity for Rapistan Corporation which was usurped by three of
its executives.96 The trial court found that the three Rapistan
executives learned that Alvey was for sale in their capacities as
individuals and not as Rapistan managers. 7 The Michigan
court discussed what it referred to as the seminal Delaware
case, Guth, the Guth Rule and the Guth Corollary.9 8 According
to the Michigan court, the Guth Corollary draws a distinction
between an opportunity which comes to a corporate officer or
director as an individual rather than in his official capacity,
indicating that if such an opportunity is not essential to the
corporation, or is not one in which it has an interest or expectancy, or is not one in which the officer-director has wrongfully
used the corporation's resources, then the officer-director may
treat the opportunity as his own."

Referring to the Guth Corollary, the Michigan court laid out
the path to be followed in dealing with the corporate opportunity issue:
First, a court, when determining whether a business opportunity is a corporate opportunity, must ascertain whether
the opportunity was presented to a corporate officer in the
officer's individual or representative capacity. Second, after
determining the manner in which the opportunity was presented, the court must determine the nature of the opportunity. Third, the nature of the opportunity is analyzed
differently, depending on whether the opportunity is pre-

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See
511
See
See
See
See

id.
N.W.2d 918 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
id. at 921.
id. at 922
id.
id. at 923 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)).
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sented to a corporate official in the official's individual or
corporate representative capacity. Accordingly, we cannot
say that the trial court committed legal error when it concluded that Delaware law required it to consider the capacity of the corporate officer at the time of the presentation of
the opportunity as a factor in determining whether a corporate opportunity existed and when it concluded that Delaware law required it to review the nature of the opportunity in light of the capacity of the corporate officer when
the opportunity was received.'
The court rejected the notion that the trial court erred as a
matter of law by failing to consider if the acquisition of Alvey
was desirable to Rapistan saying that "[t]he Guth Corollary
contains no requirement that the trial court examine the desirability of the opportunity."'' Admitting that the business of
Alvey was related to the business of Rapistan, the court indicated that "the acquisition of Alvey was not so indispensably
necessary to the conduct of the business of Rapistan that the
deprivation of the acquisition threatened the viability of
Rapistan."0 2 The court rejected the position that the trial
court erred by finding the opportunity not essential to
Rapistan.'1 In addition, the court rejected the position that
the trial court erred by failing to recognize an expectation or
interest by Rapistan in the acquisition of Alvey.' 4 In these
connections the court said "[w]e cannot conclude, after reviewing the trial court's findings, that those findings establish
that Rapistan had any urgent or practical need to acquire
Alvey, or that the acquisition of Alvey fit into an established
corporate policy or into the particular business focus of
Rapistan."'
The Michigan Court of Appeals also upheld the trial court's
failure to find that the use of corporate resources estopped the
three corporate executives from denying that a certain acquisition was a corporate opportunity. "° The court felt that the

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Rapistan, 511 N.W.2d at 924 (citations omitted).
I&
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id- (citations omitted).
See id. at 925.
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evidence did not "establish a sufficient application of corporate

assets to merit intervention as a matter of equity."1 7 Al-

though the court refused to apply the estoppel doctrine, its
comments on that doctrine are of interest.
The court indicated that an estoppel to deny the existence of
a corporate opportunity would be proper "if the representative
wrongfully embarked the corporation's assets in the development or acquisition of the business opportunity."" 8 The court
referred to two interesting reasons for applying the estoppel
doctrine. First, "the fiduciary is seen as having previously asserted to the corporation that the opportunity was worth pursuing, and as an equitable matter the fiduciary will not be allowed to deny the truth of his prior assertion.""°9 Second, the
court offered a more realistic reason behind the equitable rule,
which was explained as follows:
[Tihe "core principle" of the corporate opportunity doctrine
is that a corporation's fiduciary will not be permitted to
usurp a business opportunity which was developed through
the use of corporate assets. "The principle rests on the same
considerations that forbid appropriations of the assets themselves, but adds the remedy of tracing the misappropriated
assets into their product-a conventional remedy in the law
of trusts."10°
The court indicated that the estoppel rule would apply where
there has been a use of corporate assets to develop the opportunity "even if it was not feasible for the corporation to pursue
the opportunity or it had no expectancy in the project.""' The
court pointed out that the rule against misapplying corporate
funds applies equally to business opportunities outside the line
of business of the corporation."
The court also listed items which could be regarded as corpo-

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id (citations omitted)
110. Id at 926 (quoting Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 557 (M. App. Ct.
1982) (citations omitted)).
111. Rapistan, 511 N.W.2d at 926.
112. See id (citing In re Trim-Lean Meat Prods., Inc., 4 B.R. 243, 247 (Bankr. Del.
1980)).
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rate assets for purposes of applying the corporate opportunity
doctrine. The court pointed to a fiduciary's compensated time as
a corporate asset, indicating that the estoppel would apply to a
person who uses company time to develop the opportunity. 113
The court also pointed to use of the compensated time of other
corporate employees as assets."4 The court indicated that
"[c]orporate assets also include cash, facilities, contracts, goodwill, and corporate information."" The court distinguished between "hard" assets, such as cash, facilities, and contracts, and
"soft" assets, such as goodwill, working time, and corporate
information, saying that, generally speaking, estoppel is applied
more consistently when "hard" assets are used."' The court
indicated that the concept of a corporate asset and its relationship to the diverted opportunity is "less clear when what is
involved is the time of an executive or information about a new
project discovered by an officer during, but not strictly within,
the course of his employment."" 7 In Rapistan, the court concluded that corporate fimds, facilities, personnel, and compensated time were used by corporate executives to further the
attempt to acquire the corporate opportunity, but such use involved only minimal amounts." The court noted that
"[g]enerally, it appears that estoppel applies where there has
been a significant use of corporate assets by a fiduciary and
where there is a direct and substantial nexus or causal connection between the assets [used] and the creation, pursuit, and
acquisition of the business opportunity."" 9 The court found
the use of corporate assets in this case minimal, and also that
the record failed to demonstrate a direct and substantial nexus
or causal connection between the use of corporate assets and
the creation, development, and acquisition of the corporate
opportunity." Finally, the court pointed out that the evidence

113. See Rapistan, 511 N.W.2d at 926.
114. See id.(citing Graham, 444 N.E.2d at 549).
115. Rapistan, 511 N.W.2d at 926 (citing Victor Brudney & Robert C. Clark, A
New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1006-07 (1981)).
116. See Rapistan, 511 N.W.2d at 926 (citing Brudney & Clark, supra note 115,
1008-09).
117. Rapistan, 511 N.W.2d at 926 (quoting Brudney & Clark, supra note 115,
1008-09).
118. Rapistan, 511 N.W.2d at 926.
119. Id. at 927.
120. See id.
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failed to establish that confidential or proprietary information
was used by the former corporate executives."
VI. AMBIGUITIES IN CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY CASES-

REFLECTIONS ON BROZ, NORTHEAST HARBOR,
MARKAL AND RAPISTAN

A. The Capacity Issue
Although both the Delaware Court in Broz and the Maine
Court in Northeast Harbor sought a degree of clarity in applying corporate opportunity principles, it is evident that both
legal and factual issues made the clarity goal difficult to
achieve. Both the Delaware court, in Broz, and the Maine court,
using the ALI section 5.05 approach in Northeast Harbor, consider the capacity in which the director learns of an opportunity
to be of great importance. In Broz, the Guth Corollary features
the capacity issue as a factor and further indicates that, if the
license had been offered to CIS, an issue as fundamental as the
misappropriation of the proprietary information of the corporation could be present. The Rapistan case, applying Delaware
law, also emphasizes the capacity issue. In defining a corporate
opportunity, ALI section 5.05(b)(1) is similar in its concern
about the situation in which the director or senior executive becomes aware of an opportunity in connection with the performance of functions or under circumstances that would reasonably lead the official to believe that the person offering the
opportunity expects it to be offered to the corporation.
Although the seizure of an opportunity for himself or herself
by a corporate official, when the opportunity has been presented to the official for the purpose of transmission to the corporation, may sometimes be clearly and contemptibly disloyal, in
some cases determining the reasonable belief of the corporate
official or the capacity in which the official has received an
opportunity may not be easy. Consider the corporate official
who receives a phone call at her home or even her corporate
office from a realtor with whom she is well acquainted who

121. See id.
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tells her about a good real estate opportunity; or consider that
the same realtor has told her about the opportunity while playing golf with her. It may not be obvious to the corporate official
as to whom the offer is being directed, or it may seem to the
corporate official that the offer is being tendered to her as an
individual. Testimony may indicate later that the realtor intended the offer to be transmitted to the corporation or to the
official as an individual, or to both, or that the realtor had not
really given any thought to the matter or to consideration of
the separate capacities of the recipient of the offer.
In both the Broz and the Northeast Harbor cases, the courts
refer to the question of the intent of the offeror. Yet it seems
that the test for this issue more appropriately should involve
the thinking and reasonable belief of the offeree (i.e., the corporate official who received the information). In any event, how
can an official be perceived as disloyal in terms of the corporate
opportunity doctrine if the official reasonably believes the offer
to be made to himself or herself as an individual, unless other
reasons for applying the doctrine of corporate opportunity to the
official exist? The comment to ALI section 5.05(b) states:
Accordingly, the focus under this provision [referring to
section 5.05(b)(1)(A)l is on whether a reasonable person in
the position of the senior executive or director would assume that an opportunity was proffered for personal or
corporate benefit. The director or senior executive has a
duty of reasonable inquiry as to whether the opportunity
was intended for the corporation.'
One can imagine, perhaps with some difficulty, the director or
officer on the golf course turning to the offeror and making a
reasonable inquiry-are you offering this opportunity to me or
to the corporation I work for or serve? One can stretch the
imagination to contemplate the kind of response the inquiry
would elicit. Indeed, it seems quite possible that there will be
situations in which it is not clear to the corporate official as to
what is the intent of the offeror, and the offeror may have been
unclear in his or her mind as to whom the offer is being made
by virtue of seeing a certain coincidence of interests on the part

122. ALI, supra note 4, § 5.05(b) cmt (b)(1).
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of the director or officer and the corporation she serves.
Furthermore, determining factually or legally under ALI
section 5.05 if the awareness of an opportunity comes from the
use of corporate information or property may be difficult. As a
matter of legal interpretation, does the language mean that if
the official learns of the opportunity by reading a newspaper or
magazine provided in the corporate library, or on a corporate
computer, or by using a corporate telephone, that it involves
the use of corporate property? In looking at Northeast Harbor
and the ALI test, other legal issues arise: does purchasing land
to prevent development involve an opportunity to engage in a
business activity within the meaning of ALI section 5.05(b)(1)
or (2)? The Maine Supreme Court seemed to assume so, and
this is not an unreasonable interpretation. Nevertheless, the
language should be more clear. Under (b)(2) the added question
arises of whether the business activity involved "is closely related to a business in which the corporation is engaged or expects
to engage."' The answer to this question is hardly self-evident. Of course, there is nothing startling about the idea that
litigation may involve difficult legal and factual questions, and
the capacity issue appears at times to be of such importance in
considering the duties of corporate officials, that on occasion it
will have to be faced even with its difficulties. Also daunting is
the question of how to advise corporate officials, who are the
recipients of presentations or offers from others, regarding ways
in which to inquire or react in order to protect themselves from
trouble. Perhaps how a corporate official becomes aware of an
opportunity should not be so significant, because of difficult
factual questions connected to that issue. It may be that as a
matter of policy a director should be held to a high standard of
fiduciary responsibility no matter how he or she becomes aware
of certain opportunities.
B. The Timing Issue and the Information to be Assessed by a
Corporate Official
The Broz case also illustrates the importance of and ambiguities involved with the question of timing. At what point in

123. ALI, supra note 4, § 5.05(b)(2).
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time must a corporate official determine the relevant facts as to
whether a particular opportunity is a corporate opportunity?
The Delaware Supreme Court opinion contains variations in
language on this point and is not free of ambiguity in other
respects. In considering the financial ability factor, the court
stated that "Broz was required to consider the facts only as
they existed at the time he determined to accept the Mackinac
offer and embark on his efforts to bring the transaction to fruition."' In connection with the interest or expectancy test,
the court seems concerned about the interest of CIS "at the
time [the opportunity] was presented to Broz."' Thus, the
court stated that "Broz was required to consider the situation
only as it existed when the opportunity was presented." 6
Again, in connection with whether Broz was required to consider the interests of PriCellular when he chose to purchase Michigan-2, the court said:
As stated in Guth, a director's right to "appropriate
[an] ...

opportunity depends on the circumstances existing

at the time it presented itself to him without regard to
subsequent events." At the time Broz purchased Michigan-2,
PriCellular had not yet acquired CIS. Any plans to do so
would still have been wholly speculative. Accordingly, Broz
was not required to consider the contingent and uncertain
plans of PriCellular in reaching his determination of how to
proceed.'

In explaining the policy behind its timing position, the court
pointed to certainty and predictability as values to be promoted
in Delaware corporation law and stated:
Broz, as an active participant in the cellular telephone

industry, was entitled to proceed in his own economic interest in the absence of any countervailing duty. The right of
a director or officer to engage in business affairs outside of
his or her fiduciary capacity would be illusory if these individuals were required to consider every potential, future
occurrence in determining whether a particular business

124.
125.
126.
127.

Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 156 (DeL 1996).
Id. at 156 n.8.
Id.
Id at 158 (citations omitted).
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strategy would implicate fiduciary duty concerns. In order
for a director to engage meaningfully in business unrelated
to his or her corporate role, the director must be allowed to
make decisions based on the situation as it exists at the
time a given opportunity is presented. Absent such a rule,
the corporate fiduciary would be constrained to refrain from
exploiting any opportunity for fear of liability based on the
occurrence of subsequent events. This state of affairs would
unduly restrict officers and directors and would be antithetical to certainty in corporation law.m
It is evident that the court in some of its timing phraseology
emphasizes the time of presentation of the offer or opportunity
to the director, but uses different language in connection with
the financial ability issue when it uses the time the director
determined to accept the offer and embark on efforts to bring
the transaction to fruition. Obviously, the time of presentation
and the time of determining to accept and embark may be quite
different. While it is possible to decide in advance to accept a
particular offer if tendered, it may be that an offer is presented
before a director determines to accept it and even that a final
determination to accept an offer may actually occur sometime
after an offer is made. What problems exist with respect to the
formulations of the court? A person may determine to accept an
offer if a mutual agreement can be reached or certain conditions are met or financing can be obtained. Does this constitute
a sufficient determination to accept which would satisfy that
portion of the court's language? Must the determination be
communicated or dispatched in the form of an acceptance or
otherwise to the offeror or someone else, or is determination
without communication or dispatch sufficient? Has the director
determined to embark on efforts so as to meet the requirement
at such time that the director decides to tell the offeror that
she wishes to negotiate, or when she consults or decides to
consult her own lawyer about the transaction, or at some other
point?
Suppose there is a mental decision to accept but no thought
about embarking on efforts to bring the transaction to fruition
and the corporation has a change in circumstances which en-

128. I& at 159.
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ables it to consider the offer-what happens then? Are the
equities between the director and the corporation different if
the director has spent significant resources of her own in embarking on efforts to bring the transaction to fruition? Consider
how matters would be different if the director's position is determined by when the offer is presented rather than when
there is a determination to accept and embark.
In addition, what does the court mean when it speaks of the
"situation only as it existed"' or uses similar language? Such
a situation as seen by a corporate official may comprise existing
facts, highly probable developments, and less likely possibilities
of varying degrees. Limiting corporate officials' responsibility to
existing facts may place the corporation too much in harm's
way. Is it the intent of the Delaware court to excuse the director or officer totally from considering the potential impact of
subsequent probable occurrences, no matter how highly probable and important they may be? For example, should the corporate official be allowed to seize an important opportunity which
her corporation would otherwise be very likely to obtain?
C. The FinancialInability Issue
As indicated above, in Broz, the court found that the lower
court erred in finding CIS financially capable of exploiting the
Michigan-2 opportunity at the time that Broz was required to
consider that factor. Recall that the financial ability factor was
listed expressly in Guth and in the factors set forth in the Broz
case. In support of its position on financial inability, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that:
The record shows that CIS was in a precarious financial
position at the time Mackinac presented the Michigan-2
opportunity to Broz. Having recently emerged from lengthy
and contentious bankruptcy proceedings, CIS was not in a
position to commit capital to the acquisition of new assets.
Further, the loan agreement entered into by CIS and its
creditors severely limited the discretion of CIS as to the
acquisition of new assets and substantially restricted the

129. Id. at 156 1.8.
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ability of CIS to incur new debt.'m
The court gave no weight to possible moves to alleviate the
financing problem which PriCellular might have undertaken.'' The court not only questioned PriCellular's own financial situation but more significantly said that "the fact that
PriCellular had available sources of financing is immaterial to
the analysis."" 2 It is worth noting that the test regarding financial ability or inability employed by the Delaware Supreme
Court appears to embrace a rather flexible approach to that
issue in the corporate opportunity area. In a 1995 case, the
Delaware Court of Chancery had taken the position that mere
"technical insolvency," such as the inability to pay current bills
when due or to secure credit, is not enough to show financial
inability."= The chancery court stated that the corporation
must be actually insolvent."M That finding was challenged,
but the Delaware Supreme Court refused to consider or determine whether the insolvency-in-fact standard is the appropriate
one in corporate opportunity cases." The court said:
While a few jurisdictions have subscribed to this standard, we do not adopt the "insolvency-in-fact" test. Since the
question of what test should be used to determine financial
inability is not presently before the Court, we merely note
that the Court of Chancery could consider, in the appropriate case, a number of options and standards for determining financial inability, including but not limited to, a balancing standard, temporary insolvency standard, or practical insolvency standard.'
Additionally, it should be noted that, in corporate opportunity
cases, financial inability as an excuse for a fiduciary taking an
opportunity may be somewhat suspect. In the Northeast Harbor
case, the Maine Supreme Court furnished reasons for this suspect status which are noted above. 7 In particular, the

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id at 155.
See id.
Id at 156.
See Yiannatsis v. Stephanis, 653 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. 1995).
See id.
See id at 279.
Id. at 279 n.2 (citations omitted).
See supra text accompanying note 21.
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disincentive to corporate executives to solve financial problems
rather than rely on financial inability as an excuse to usurp a
corporate opportunity is an important consideration. Courts
should be cautious in defining financial inability and accepting
it as an excuse for bypassing a corporation's chance to obtain a
corporate opportunity. Although the ALI approach would not
support a failure to offer a corporate opportunity to the corporation in cases in which that would be required simply because of
a financial inability excuse, the question of financial ability
could come up under section 5.05(a)(3) in considering the validity of a rejection by the corporation of the offer of an opportunity. The comment to section 5.05(a) states:
Under § 5.05(a)(3) the rejection should occur in a manner
that meets the applicable standard provided in § 5.05(a)(3)
(or § 5.12(a)(Taking of Corporate Opportunities by a Controlling Shareholder) if the director or senior executive is
also a controlling shareholder [§ 1.101). Rejection in the
context of § 5.05(a)(3) may be based on one or more of a
number of factors, such as lack of interest by the corporation in the opportunity, the corporation's financial inability
to acquire the opportunity, legal restrictions on the
corporation's ability to accept the opportunity, or unwillingness of a third party to deal with the corporation."8
It should be evident that there are important issues as to
how much weight to give to the financial inability factor, how
to define financial inability, and the factual determination of
financial inability.
D. Line of Business and Interest or Expectancy Issues
In the Broz case, the court felt that "while it may be said
with some certainty that the Michigan-2 opportunity was within
CIS' line of business, it is not equally clear that CIS had a
cognizable interest or expectancy in the license."" In a footnote, the court explained how the line of business language in
the Guth opinion is less than clear, in that such language suggests that the business strategy and financial well-being of the
corporation are relevant in determining if the opportunity is

138. ALI, supra note 4, § 5.05(a) cmt.
139. Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 156 (Del. 1996).
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within the line of business. ' The court said "[s]ince we find
that these considerations are decisive under the other factors
enunciated by the Court in Guth, we do not reach the question
of whether they are here relevant to a determination of the
corporation's line of business.""'
The court concluded that "CIS had no interest or expectancy
in the Michigan-2 opportunity."' As to this point the court explained:
Under the third factor laid down by this Court in Guth, for
an opportunity to be deemed to belong to the fiduciary's
corporation, the corporation must have an interest or
expectancy in that opportunity. As this Court stated in
Johnston, "[flor the corporation to have an actual and expectant interest in any specific property, there must be
some tie between that property and the nature of the corporate business." Despite the fact that the nature of the Michigan-2 opportunity was historically close to the core operations of CIS, changes were in process. At the time the opportunity was presented, CIS was actively engaged in the
process of divesting its cellular license holdings. CIS' articulated business plan did not involve any new acquisitions.
Further, as indicated by the testimony of the entire CIS
board, the Michigan-2 license would not have been of interest to CIS even absent CIS' financial difficulties and CIS'
then current desire to liquidate its cellular license holdings.
Thus, CIS had no interest or expectancy in the Michigan-2
opportunity.'
ALI section 5.05 does not use the line of business phrase. In
subsection (b)(2), it defines corporate opportunity as "[a]ny opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a senior
executive becomes aware and knows is closely related to a business in which the corporation is engaged or expects to engage."' Since Broz was only a director, he would not even be
tested under subsection (b)(2) which applies to a senior executive. Section (b)(1), which applies to a director or senior executive, does not appear to apply to Broz either, based on the
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See id at 156 n.7.
Id.
Id at 156-57.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
ALI, supra note 4, § 5.05(b)(2).
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findings as to how he became aware of the opportunity. Under
the ALl test, it would seem that Broz would be in the clear
without presenting the opportunity to CIS. This result would be
achieved without going through the kind of analysis which the
Delaware court used.
The ALI comment to section 5.05(b)(2) states that "[s]ection
5.05(b)(2) makes § 5.05 applicable to those properties or activities that a senior executive knows are closely related to the
business in which the corporation is engaged or expects to engage."' The comment explains how subsection (b)(2) expands
the scope of corporate opportunity beyond the concept of an
existing line of business to cover both existing or contemplated
activities of the corporation. The comment explains that this
approach establishes a more flexible standard "because it does
not limit the doctrine's applicability to a particular 'line of business,' and applies the doctrine to a contemplated activity in
which the corporation may subsequently engage."' An important question based on the more flexible standard just referred
to would be whether Broz, if he had been a senior executive,
would have a more exacting duty under ALI section 5.05 to
consider contemplated activities which the Delaware court
might find too speculative to be worthy of consideration. Of
course in the Broz case itself, by the time the acquisition of the
license would fit in with a contemplated activity concept, it may
be that Broz's activities may have already firmed up his rights
to pursue the opportunity.
The ALI approach weaves the interest or expectancy test
right into subsection (b)(2). It explains as follows:
Some older judicial decisions applied the doctrine of corporate opportunity to a contract right, property, or business
activity in which the corporation has an "interest or expectancy." Section 5.05(b) does not expressly state this concept
in a black-letter rule because § 5.05(b)(2) includes the concept of an interest or expectancy by covering a contemplated activity of a corporation.'

145. Id. § 5.05(b) cmt. (b)(2).
146. Id.
147. Id-

408

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:371

The comment to section 5.05(b)(2) also explains that it covers
"business activities that the senior executive knows are closely
related to a business in which the corporation is engaged or
expects to engage."' The comment further indicates that "[i]f
the senior executive has such knowledge, the opportunity must
be offered to the corporation without regard to the senior
executive's own judgment whether the corporation would be capable of or interested in pursuing the opportunity."' In addition, the ALI comment explains that a business activity under
section 5.05(b) "includes the acquisition or use of any contract
rights or other tangible or intangible property." 50
It may be that the ALI explanation of the interest or expectancy test under section 5.05 as stated above will actually limit
the use of the corporate opportunity doctrine. To begin, section
5.05(b)(2) covers senior executives but not directors. In addition
the ALI comment states:
Section 5.05(b)(2) does not impose on a director or senior
executive the obligation to first offer to the corporation
securities of the corporation that are to be sold to or acquired from other shareholders. On the other hand, if a
director or senior executive knows that the corporation is
interested in reacquiring its own securities, there may be
an obligation under § 5.06 to offer any securities thereafter
acquired to the corporation if the acquisitions would interfere with the corporation's reacquisition program.' 5 '
As a matter of theory and practice, courts may consider it desirable to use the interest or expectancy test as part of the
corporate opportunity doctrine to cover stock acquisitions in
cases involving directors as well as senior executives. Thus, if
as a matter of corporate policy, the corporation is in a situation
in which it is reacquiring its shares, a director's or senior
executive's acquisition of such shares may be considered improper based on an interest or expectancy analysis. 2 In any
148. Id.
149. Id.

150. Id § 5.05(b) cmt.a.
151. Id. § 5.05(b) cmt. (b)(2).
152. See Kelegian v. Mgrdichian, 39 Ca] Rptr. 2d 390 (Cal. 1995); Yiannatsis v.
Stephanis, 653 A.2d 275 (DeL 1995). These two cases point towards use of an interest
and expectancy analysis in stock purchase cases.
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event, application of the interest or expectancy test, while sometimes useful, may not always be clear.
E. Failure to Present Opportunity to Board Issue
The contrast between the Delaware position and the ALI
position on the usurpation of a corporate opportunity is clearly
shown in the situation involving the failure to present an opportunity to the board. When a corporate opportunity exists
under the ALI approach, a director or senior executive must
first offer it to the corporation. In the Broz case, the Delaware
court stated, "[ilt is not the law of Delaware that presentation
to the board is a necessary prerequisite to a finding that a
corporate opportunity has not been usurped."15 3 There is important language in the Broz case regarding the lower court
position that Broz, as a director, had to take the transaction to
the CIS board for its formal action. The Delaware Supreme
Court said, "[I]n so holding, the trial court erroneously grafted
a new requirement onto the law of corporate opportunity, viz.,
the requirement of formal presentation under circumstances
where the corporation does not have an interest, expectancy or
financial ability."' The Delaware Supreme Court pointed out
that "the director or officer must analyze the situation ex ante
to determine whether the opportunity is one rightfully belonging to the corporation."'5 5 The court went on to say, "[If the
director or officer believes, based on one of the factors articulated above, that the corporation is not entitled to the opportunity,
then he may take it for himself." 6 As noted before, under the
ALI test, Broz as a director, but not senior executive, would
have no responsibility to make a presentation to the board,
because there was no corporate opportunity under the terms of
section 5.05(b)(1). Subsection (b)(1) applies to directors or senior
executives, while section 5.05(b)(2) applies only to senior executives. Plainly, however, under the Broz case, Delaware directors
or officers are not treated in the same manner as under ALI
section 5.05.' Even an officer who is a senior executive could
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410

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:371

avoid formal presentation to the board based on one of the
factors articulated in Broz. It should be emphasized, however,
that the Delaware court does recognize the value of presenting
an opportunity to the board as follows:
Of course, presenting the opportunity to the board creates a
kind of "safe harbor" for the director, which removes the
specter of a post hoc judicial determination that the director
or officer has improperly usurped a corporate opportunity.
Thus, presentation avoids the possibility that an error in
the fiduciary's assessment of the situation will create future
liability for breach of fiduciary duty.'
Although the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the court
of chancery had erred in adding the requirement of formal
presentation to Delaware's corporate opportunity jurisprudence,
it further pointed to the advantage of presentation stating:
Recognizing the interests the Court of Chancery sought to
promote, however, we note that formal presentation to the
board is often the preferred-or "safe"-approach, and we
noted that this litigation might have been unnecessary had
this precaution been observed." 9
The Delaware test seems more strict with regard to directors
who are not senior executives than the ALI test which would
let them off the hook if the corporate opportunity does not exist
under section 5.05(b)(1). On the other hand, the Delaware court
is more lenient in not technically requiring presentation to the
board in all situations which would require such presentation
under the ALI.
Whether the corporation is adequately protected by the presentation and rejection procedures of ALI section 5.05 is open
to question. Both the rejection procedures and burden of proof
rules give a great deal of weight to action by so-called "disinterested" directors, or "disinterested" superiors, or "disinterested"
shareholders. Furthermore, the waste test"s° and business
judgment rule"' give enormous latitude to the decisions made
158. Id
159. Id. at 158 n.10.
160. See ALI, supra note 4, § 5.05(a)(3); see ALI, supra note 4, § 1.42 for a definition of waste of corporate assets.
161. See ALI, supra note 4, § 4.01 for an explanation of the Business Judgment
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by such "disinterested" persons. Surely, where the taking of a
corporate opportunity is involved, the potential for harm to the
corporation should not leave investors and creditors too much
at the mercy of so-called disinterested directors, or superiors, or
even disinterested shareholders.162 Moreover, the ALI section
5.05 rule, permitting late ratification where there has been
defective disclosure or late rejections of offers even after suits
have been filed, may weaken the protection given to the corporation significantly.
F. Use of Assets Issue
In Markal,' the Illinois court took the position that the
fiduciaries should be estopped from arguing that Markal could
not have represented Apple because they had used Markal
assets to benefit themselves and develop the Apple opportunity.
Discussion in the Rapistan case demonstrates some of the difficulties involved in the application of the "use of corporate assets" test. 164 The court pointed to a distinction between the
use of "hard" assets and "soft" assets in applying the estoppel
doctrine.1" Such a distinction seems hard to justify. For example, the use of corporate facilities may not have nearly the
impact on a corporation as the use of a corporate executive's
working time in developing a corporate opportunity. The court
also pointed to "significant use" and "nexus" factors in dealing
with the use of assets issue." These latter factors may often
be relevant in determining if there has been a usurpation of a
corporate opportunity. In some situations, it may be inequitable

Rule.
162. The degree of protection provided to the corporation by a disinterested director vote may vary. For example, directors may show favoritism toward each other or
be reluctant to assume an adversarial role toward the aspirations of other directors.
See Harvey Gelb, Corporate Disloyalty-A Wyoming Case and the ALT Project, 21 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 126-27 (1986). Moreover, the protective impact of a disinterested
shareholder vote may be reduced, eliminated or illusory depending on such factors as
the degree of diligence the shareholders could be expected to achieve in a given situation. See id. at 123.
163. Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 643 N.E.2d 1206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 171 (1995).
164. See Rapistan Corp. v. Michaels, 511 N.W.2d 918 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
165. See fid.
at 926.
166. See id. at 926-27.
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or inappropriate to impose liability on corporate officials on the
basis of the corporate opportunity doctrine because of the minor
or immaterial use of assets.
ALI section 5.05 differs from Rapistan and Guth in that its
language is quite narrow. It classifies an opportunity as a "corporate opportunity" when a director or senior executive becomes
aware of it in certain ways, such as through the use of corporate property or in connection with the performance of certain
functions. 7 Nevertheless, suppose the director or senior executive becomes aware of the opportunity independently of the
corporate functions or other factors listed under section
5.05(b)(1) and then uses corporate assets to develop the opportunity. Such a use is technically not within the language of the
ALI section. The narrowness of the ALI language is in contrast
to the language of the Guth Corollary which speaks of the
wrongful employment of the resources of the corporation in
pursuing or exploiting the opportunity. The Rapistan court also
speaks of the use of assets in the broader context. An ALI
comment under section 5.04 states as follows:
The use of corporate time to engage in personal activities
should not be treated as the use of corporate property for
which reimbursement is to be made. However, the fact that
a full-time senior executive has used a corporate position to
permit himself to gain a personal pecuniary benefit during
business hours will be included among the relevant facts to
be considered in determining whether the executive has
taken a corporate opportunity.'
This comment does not resolve the potential problem created by
the narrow language of section 5.05(b)(1). Furthermore, while
remedies may be available under ALI section 5.04 or otherwise
with respect to the use of corporate property, such remedies
may not match up with those which may be available under
the corporate opportunity doctrine in the "use of corporate assets" situation.'69 Finally, some of the questions raised earlier
about the ambiguity of the ALI test with respect to whether
there is a use of corporate property in situations, such as where

167. See ALI, supra note 4, § 5.05(b)(1).

168. Id. § 5.04 cmt. (b)(1).
169. See id § 5.04.
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the corporate official learns of the opportunity by reading a
magazine in the corporate library, will need to be resolved.
Perhaps factors like "significant use" and "nexus" relied on in
Rapistan will also be read into the ALI approach.
G. Laches
Recall that the Maine Supreme Court left open the use of the
doctrine of laches in the Northeast Harbor case.'70 Arguably,
the Delaware Broz case could also involve the kind of delay and
inaction that might raise a laches issue. The practical importance of the doctrine of laches in corporate opportunity cases is
well illustrated in Tarin v. Pellonari,'7 ' a case decided by an
Illinois appellate court. The plaintiff and two defendants were
directors and shareholders in a radiator business referred to in
the case as BOYCH. The defendants created a new radiator
business referred to as Cool Rite, which plaintiff contended was
in competition with BOYCH. In a suit filed on May 4, 1990,
plaintiff sought the imposition of a constructive trust for the
benefit of BOYCH and himself, based upon misappropriated
corporate opportunities and assets. The lower court concluded
The court pointed to
that this claim was barred by laches.'
trial court findings that the plaintiff knew as early as 1988
that the defendants were in the process of opening a new radiator shop; that in February, 1989 the plaintiff became aware
that the formation of Cool Rite could hurt BOYCH; that plaintiff knew as early as February 1989 that suppliers were shipping merchandise to Cool Heat, which would be used by Cool
The lower court found that the plaintiff never exRite.'
pressed concern about the organization of Cool Rite or threatened the defendants with a law suit.'74
The court pointed out that the plaintiff waited until May 4,
1990, to file the lawsuit and, while idly sitting on his rights,
defendants were investing their time and money in starting up
the business. The lower court noted that there was a strong
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inference the plaintiff delayed filing suit, waiting to see how
successful Cool Rite would be, before investing money to hire a
lawyer and assert his interest in a business that might not be
successful. The appellate court found the record supported the
trial court's findings of fact regarding when the plaintiff learned
of defendants' activities and that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by applying laches to the case.'7 5
The result in this case should be a warning to potential
plaintiffs about the dangers of sitting on their rights to the
detriment of the opposing party. A good argument could be
made that the plaintiff should not be precluded from suit simply by waiting to see how successful Cool Rite would be. Why
should a plaintiff not be in a position to properly evaluate a
case before suing? More to the point, plaintiffs failure to express concern about the organization of Cool Rite or to threaten
a law suit may make it inappropriate to allow plaintiff to proceed later. Thus, a defendant who determines to accept an offer
and embark on the expenditure of funds to pursue an opportunity, while lulled into believing that there is a lack of interest
on the part of the potential plaintiff, may have a good laches
defense.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is evident that, in accepting the ALI section 5.05 position
regarding corporate opportunity, the Maine Supreme Court was
seeking to bring clarity to a murky area of the law. Furthermore, in Broz, the Delaware Supreme Court supported certainty
and predictability as values to be promoted in Delaware corporation law. Still, it can be expected that there will be a number
of occasions where uncertainty will arise either because of legal
issues or factual issues, whether it be under the ALI test
adopted by Maine, or the Delaware test, or some other test.
The topics discussed above regarding capacity, timing and information to be assessed, financial inability, line of business and
interest or expectancy, and laches suggest some of the difficult
issues that exist. Even the use of assets as a trigger for the
application of the corporate opportunity doctrine is not without

175. See id. at 550-51.
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its analytical difficulties. Still, the ALI test and the Delaware
court statements regarding presentation to the board of directors to achieve a safe harbor should encourage corporate officials, as a matter of preventive law, to avoid or lower the risk
of severe damage remedies by giving the corporation the first
crack at a particular opportunity in appropriate situations.
Nevertheless, in some circumstances, the safe harbor may not
be absolutely safe. For example, even rejection by the board of
directors or shareholders under the ALI test is potentially subject to further challenge. 76 Alas, despite court efforts to
achieve clarity in corporate opportunity cases, the determination
of fiduciary responsibilities and liabilities in various settings
will at times be difficult to make.

176. See supra text accompanying note 32 regarding rejection.

